论契约的不完全性及其经济影响

《教学与研究》 ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (7): 23-29.DOI:

论契约的不完全性及其经济影响

陈赤平

湘潭大学商学院, 湖南湘潭411105

收稿日期:2005-03-20 出版日期:2005-07-20 发布日期:2012-03-05

On Incompleteness of Contract and Its Impact on Economy

CHEN Chi-ping

School of Business, Xiangtan University, Xiangtan, Hunan 411105, China

Received:2005-03-20 Online:2005-07-20 Published:2012-03-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 契约可以分为完全契约和不完全契约,不完全契约是理解组织问题的核心。从绝对意义上来说,所有的契约都是不完全的。但现实中,有些契约的不完全程度远远超出了有限理性所能解释的范围。由理性限制所引起的契约的不完全性和人们出于效率的考虑而故意维持的较高程度的不完全性对经济产生的影响是很不相同的,前者会产生一系列负面影响,而后者的目的恰恰是为了消除或减少这种负面影响。契约的不完全程度则取决于缔约当事人对这两方面的权衡。

关键词: 有限理性, 不完全契约, 契约的不完全程度, 经济影响

Abstract: Contracts can be divided into complete contract and incomplete contract. Incomplete contract is the core for understanding organizational factors. In an extreme view no contract can be absolutely complete. In fact, the degree of incompleteness of certain contracts has gone beyond the scope of which limited rationality is capable of interpreting. Incompleteness in contracts caused by limited rationality and incompleteness caused by deliberate high degree of incompleteness due to consideration of efficiency has different impact on economy. The former will give rise negative aspects while the latter will eliminate such negative aspects. The degree of incompleteness of contracts depends on considerations into these aspects by both parties involved.

Key words: limited rationality, incomplete contract, degree of incompleteness of contract, economic effect

中图分类号:

F019

陈赤平. 论契约的不完全性及其经济影响[J]. 《教学与研究》, 2005, (7): 23-29.

CHEN Chi-ping. On Incompleteness of Contract and Its Impact on Economy[J]. Teaching and Research, 2005, (7): 23-29.

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