Abstract: As the leading management paradigm in the US, shareholder primacy has caused a disconnect between corporate profit margins and the rate of accumulation, leading to a longterm economic stagnation of “prosperity without investment”. Influenced by the principle of “shareholder value maximization”, American listed companies now show distinct characteristics of deaccumulation. The value extraction method represented by stock repurchase and stock dividend aims to expand financial returns, undermining the industrial capital accumulation process of “retainandreinvest”. Based on the growth dynamics of the stock market, enterprises are forced to become shortsighted, which intensifies the speculative nature of investment decisionmaking by managers. Large corporations sit back taking no notice of the decline of their internal innovation capacity, and maintain their market position by monopoly rents. As a key microcomposition of the neoliberal social structure of accumulation (SSA) in the United States, the shareholder governance model takes advantage of the characteristics of innovative activities to capture the social benefits originally belonging to the government and laborers, exposing the exploitative and parasitic nature of the capitalist mode of production. 

Key words: shareholder governance system, neoliberalism, capital accumulation, social structure of accumulation 

摘要： 股东至上的价值观念已成为美国企业的主导性经营范式，造成公司利润率与积累率相脱节，致使经济长期处于“无投资繁荣”的停滞状态。受股东利益最大化原则的影响，如今美国上市公司呈现出鲜明的去积累特征。以分红回购为代表的价值榨取手段旨在扩大金融回报，破坏了“盈余保留再投资”的产业资本积累过程。基于股市的增长动态迫使企业短视化运营，加剧了经理人决策的投机性。大公司坐视内部创新能力下降，转而借助垄断租金维持市场地位。作为美国新自由主义积累的社会结构（SSA）的关键性微观构成，股东治理模式利用创新活动特性，攫取了原本属于政府与劳动者的社会收益，暴露出资本主义生产方式的剥削性与寄生性。

关键词: 股东治理制度, 新自由主义, 资本积累, 积累的社会结构