A Review of Researches on Team Incentives in Economics

Abstract

Abstract: The paper presents a systematic review of the development trends and major ideas of the team incentive theory since the 1980s.The authors divide the existing literature into two categories according to the varying theories and duration of the teams,and then discuss the two branches respectively.One branch deals with optimal incentive mechanism design in the short run,and the other covers the repetition of the agency game in the long run.At the end of the paper,major contributions of the team incentive theories are summarized,their limitations are pointed out,and future research in this area is discussed.

Key words: team incentives, optimal mechanism, repeated games

摘要： 本文系统概括了20世纪80年代以来团队激励理论的发展方向和主要内容,根据理论基础的差异以及团队存在周期的不同,本文将这一领域划分成两大分支——单期条件下的团队最优激励机制设计理论和多期重复博弈框架中的团队激励理论,然后展开介绍相关文献。最后,文章总结了团队激励理论的主要贡献,指出了其中存在的若干问题,探讨了这一领域未来的发展趋势。

关键词: 团队激励, 最优机制设计, 重复博弈

CLC Number:

F244

YI Ding-hong, PENG Peng. A Review of Researches on Team Incentives in Economics[J]. Teaching and Research, 2006, (11): 80-86.

易定红, 彭鹏. 经济学中团队激励理论述评[J]. 《教学与研究》, 2006, (11): 80-86.

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