主管:教育部
主办:中国人民大学
ISSN 0257-2826  CN 11-1454/G4

Teaching and Research ›› 2023, Vol. 57 ›› Issue (2): 93-104.

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Analysis of the Evolution of the Game Relationship between Digital Platform Founders and Capital Owners

  

  1. School of Economics, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou, Fujian 530007, China
  • Online:2023-02-16 Published:2023-02-17

数字平台创始人与资本所有者的博弈关系演化分析

  

  1. 福建师范大学经济学院
  • 作者简介:赵秀丽,福建师范大学经济学院教授(福建 福州530007)。
  • 基金资助:
    本文系国家社科基金项目“资本主义平台经济条件下劳资关系的新变化研究”(项目号:21BJL092)的阶段性成果。论文受到福建师范大学“全国中国特色社会主义政治经济学研究中心” 资助。

Abstract: The digital platform is a new form of production organization, whose formation requires three major conditions, creativity, capital, and technology, and involves two major actors, idea owners and capital owners. From the initiation and operation to the phase of maturity and monopoly of digital platforms, the relationship between the idea owner (iethe “founder” of digital platforms) and the capital owner has undergone a series of evolutionary processes. With the evolution from the game relationship between idea owners and capital owners at the beginning of establishment of the digital platform to “the control relationship of creative labor over venture capital”, and to such relationship between “platform capital and venture capital” due to the maturity and monopoly of digital platforms, the creative labor is captured by capital and evolved into platform capital, forming a relationship in which capitals share surplus value. The essence of the evolution of the relationships between digital platform founders and capital owners is a sublation of the capitalist mode of production. The evolution of “creative labor” into platform capital has not changed the nature of capitalist production relations, while the division of labor, technology and organizational interaction are the ultimate forces driving the evolution of capitalist production relations. We can standardize the capital behavior on digital platforms through means such as strengthening the sovereignty of laborers on digital platforms through policy intervention, optimizing the innovative resource allocation on digital platforms by fully utilizing advantages of the organizational control models, and attaching more attention to creative work and innovative activities of laborers in the digital economy. 


Key words: idea owners, capital owners, game relationship, control relationship, capture relationship

摘要: 数字平台作为新型生产组织形式,其形成需要具备创意、资本和技术三大条件,牵涉创意所有者和资本所有者两大主体。从数字平台的发起、运行到成熟与垄断阶段,数字平台的创意所有者“创始人”同资本所有者的关系经历了一系列的演化过程。由数字平台发起之初的创意所有者和资本所有者之间的博弈制衡关系,演变到“创意劳动对风险投资资本的驾驭关系”;伴随数字平台的成熟与垄断,演变到“平台资本与风险投资资本”的关系,创意劳动被资本俘获演化为平台资本,形成资本与资本共同分割剩余价值的关系。数字平台创始人与资本所有者关系演化的本质,是对资本主义生产方式的一种扬弃;“创意劳动”演变成平台资本并没有改变资本主义生产关系的本质;分工、技术与组织互动是推动资本主义生产关系演化的终极力量。我们可以通过政策干预规范数字平台资本行为,强化数字平台上的劳动者主权;利用数字平台组织控制模式的优势,引导数字平台进行创新性的资源配置;在数字经济中应更加重视劳动者的活劳动和创新活动。

关键词: idea所有者, 资本所有者, 博弈关系, 驾驭关系, 俘获关系