A Review of Conflict Economics

Abstract

Abstract: Among the different modes of social interaction,mainstrain economics emphasizes market exchange and neglects conflict actions.Conflict economics and exchange economics should constitute two coequal branches of economic analysis,the first based upon contract and mutual gain,the second upon contest for asymmetric advantage.The main topics of conflict economics are sources of conflict,technology of struggle and redistribution effect of conflict.Integrating conflict theory with exchange theory will broaden the dimensions of microeconomics.It will thus help us not only to better understand our traditional topics of optimizing behavior and market equilibrium,but also to better study the nature of man and of social interactions.

Key words: conflict economics, exchange economics, review

摘要： 在不同的社会互动模式中,主流经济学关注了市场交易而忽略了冲突行为。冲突经济学和交易经济学一起,应该构成经济分析的两个平行分支,前者研究基于双方均势基础之上的交易与互利行为,而后者研究基于单边优势基础之上的斗争与互害行为。冲突经济学的主要议题包括冲突的根源、斗争的技术与冲突对再分配的影响等。冲突理论与交易理论的结合将拓宽微观经济学的视野,因而不仅可以帮助我们更好地理解最优化行为与市场均衡这些传统话题,而且有助于我们更好地研究人类本性与社会互动。

关键词: 冲突经济学, 交易经济学, 综述

CLC Number:

F019

ZHAO Ling-ling. A Review of Conflict Economics[J]. Teaching and Research, 2008, (4): 73-79.

赵玲玲. 冲突经济学研究述评[J]. 《教学与研究》, 2008, (4): 73-79.

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