关键词: 声誉 , 不可交易声誉 , 可交易声誉 , 可观测的声誉交易

Abstract: Traditional reputation theory explains the phenomenon of cooperation equilibrium through repeated games. But this theory has been challenged in two ways: First, it cannot explain reputation in a one shot game; Secondly, this model often contains multiple equilibria, making it hard to respond to questions from the model exogenous assumption about the choice of equilibrium. The tradable reputation model can address these challenges. It explains that “even in a one shot framework the seller is well motivated to maintain good reputation”, a seemingly simple fact that the multiple game theory cannot explain. The tradable reputation model assigns cooperation the only equilibrium in the model and thus avoids troubles from multiple equilibriums. This article attempts to sort out the development of the tradable reputation theory, discuss how it ensures the cooperation equilibrium in a short term (even in one shot cooperation), and how it functions as a exist mechanism to restrain immoral behavior of the seller in the last transaction.

Key words: reputation , non-tradable reputation , tradable reputation , observable reputation trading