From Complete Contract Theory to Incomplete Contract Theory

Abstract

Abstract: Unlike the mainstream neo-classical economics that impersonates the mechanism of price, the contract theory attempts to explain the contracted relation between rational economic a-gents. However, like all scientific research, there exist various interrelated branches within the contract theory. Generally speaking, with the further progress of the research, the focus of attention has shifted from the complete contract theory to the incomplete contract theory. This article is intended to introduce briefly the course of the changes, placing emphasis on the incomplete contract theory and hot issues concerning development of this theory.

Key words: complete contract theory, principal-agent theory, transaction cost economics, incomplete contract theory

摘要： 与研究非人格化的价格机制的主流新古典经济学不同,合同理论试图揭示理性的经济主体之间的合同关系。然而,与所有的科学研究一样,合同理论内部也存在不同的分支或学派,并且它们之间还存在继承与发展的关系。从总的趋势来说,随着研究的深入,合同理论研究的热点正在从完全合同理论转移到对合同不完全性的关注。本文对这一转变过程作了简要的介绍,并重点介绍了不完全合同理论及其发展等前沿问题。

关键词: 合同理论, 委托代理理论, 交易费用理论, 不完全合同理论

CLC Number:

YANG Qi-jing. From Complete Contract Theory to Incomplete Contract Theory[J]. Teaching and Research, 2003, (7): 27-33.

杨其静. 从完全合同理论到不完全合同理论[J]. 《教学与研究》, 2003, (7): 27-33.

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